



**MIND** over  
**MEDIUM**

# Reading

to become  
acquainted with  
or look over the  
contents of  
(something, such  
as a book)

# When it comes to reading





**We're not  
in Kansas  
anymore**

“Each medium, independent of the content it mediates, has its own intrinsic effects which are its unique message.”

—Marshall McLuhan




“We human beings are not just the product of what we read, but how we read.”

—Maryanne Wolf

# Medium Affects Content



# Medium Affects Reading



# Print Deep Reading



**LINEAR**




# Print



**LINEAR**

# Desktop Hyper Reading




**NONLINEAR**

# Print



**LINEAR**

# Desktop



**NONLINEAR**

# Smartphone Utility Reading




# Books



**LINEAR**

# Pages




**NONLINEAR**

# Messages



**NONLINEAR**


# Worlds Are Colliding



# Nonlinear and Messages

What we consume

Where we connect













# Smartphones Have Rules



# 1st Rule


Users  
Control the  
Medium



Users decide how the App will behave

# 2<sup>nd</sup> Rule


# Preview & Search for Content



Images, headlines and summaries provide guideposts

# 3<sup>rd</sup> Rule

# Minimize Content Scrolling



Short-form (< 1000 words) is prevalent on smartphones

# 4<sup>th</sup> Rule

Send  
Relevant  
Information



Content is pushed to the user

# How do we apply the rules when

Capitalism implies competition. With the emergence of large corporations and cartels - i.e. the advent of monopoly capitalism - this competition assumed a new dimension. It became qualitatively more politico-economic, and therefore military-economic. What was at stake was no longer the fate of businesses representing some tens of thousands of pounds or hundreds of thousands of dollars. At stake now were industrial and financial giants whose assets ran into tens of millions of pounds. Accordingly, states and their armies involved themselves in the competition for investment in new markets, for access to raw materials, for control of strategic resources, such as oil, and for the increasingly pronounced competition for the leadership of the world. On the other hand, the competition for the leadership of the world in the industrial capacity of the technically most advanced firms, the total output of the main industrial powers, and especially the expansion of finance capital and investment potential, increasingly spilled across the boundaries of nation-states, even the largest ones. This spread of individual nations' capital resources inevitably led to breakdown competition for external resources, markets and control of trade-routes, within the boundaries of the world and most spectacularly - outside the continent of Europe. In 1914 European nations began to annex and divide up Africa, Asia and Africa.

## 1. The Stakes

12 Yet the creation of colonial empires following the international thrust of capital proved to be only a temporary answer to the problem of the growing disproportion between development of the productive forces and the political form within which this development had taken place: the nation-state. Given the poverty and low growth rates of the colonies, their demand for manufactured goods was inherently limited; they were hardly a substitute for the lucrative markets to be found in the industrial countries themselves, whose systematic closure - via the high tariffs on imported goods and capital increasingly imposed by the end of the nineteenth century - accelerated the colonial drive. At the same time the fact that the world had become divided relatively early on, to the special advantage of the Western rim of the European continent, meant that later industrial powers (USA, Germany, Russia, Japan) had little space to expand overseas. Their prodigious development issued in a powerful challenge to the existing territorial arrangements. It upset the concomitant balance of political and economic power. The growing conflict between the burgeoning productive forces and the prevailing political structures could less and less be contained by conventional diplomacy or local military skirmishes. The power coalitions which this conflict lured merely exacerbated it, ensuring that it would reach exploding-point. The explosion occurred with the First World War.

It is not surprising that the first move in questioning the status quo should have been made by Germany, which had assumed the industrial leadership of Europe and hence was in a position to challenge a colonial share-out favourable to Britain and the USA. The force of arms. The prospect of the continent's German domination, with all its implications for the colonies and other dependent states, was a threat only to those most immediately affected - Russia, but also for the non-European powers of the United States. In the event, US imperialism and the Entente proved decisive in the defeat of Germany.

Yet World War One in no way brought an end to the competition between economic and political powers. Germany was defeated, but not from the race for world leadership. The door for a new arrival: socialist revolution in Russia, the consolidation of Bolshevik power in 1917, leading to the appearance of a new superpower - the USSR - in Europe and Italy; the growth of the Japanese empire in the Far East.

which produced a massive shift to the left in the victor countries themselves at its close - these changed the whole meaning of international warfare for the bourgeoisie. From the outset the new arrangement between victors and vanquished was overshadowed by the desire of the ruling classes to prevent the spread of revolution, especially to Germany. American, British and even French imperialists did not dare completely to disarm their German competitors, lest the German working class take power. Indeed, between November 1918 and October 1923, the *Reichswehr* was the only real force defending the weakened capitalist order in Germany. The construction of Versailles was that the victors wanted to weaken German capitalism without really dismantling it and while keeping its industrial power intact. This made its military comeback inevitable.

The point has been made many times that the Second World War was a logical and inevitable outcome of World War One. But the link between the two is commonly reduced to the anti-German clauses of the Versailles Treaty, and especially the foolish policy of reparations on which the French bourgeoisie was particularly insistent. In truth, although the terms of the peace settlement certainly helped to exacerbate the political, military and above all economic conflicts that dominated the twenties and thirties and paved the way to WWII, they did not create these problems - any more than 'reckless' planning by the Austrian, Russian, German or French general staffs caused WWII.

From this respect it is instructive to look beyond strictly European boundaries to the peculiar relationship developing between China, Germany, the USA, and the USSR, which would eventually lead to the Pacific War. In 1905 the USA and the USSR collaborated in the suppression of the Boxer Revolt in China. In 1905 the Russo-Japanese peace treaty gave the USA a free hand in the Far East. Britain and the USA supported the USA against Germany in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Hence the fact that the USA was gradually embarked upon a course of imperialist expansion from that of German imperialism imposed on her by her treaty obligations to the target of the Japanese war was a necessary outcome of the world, Japan's rise to world power, and the all-out war it unleashed against the USA in 1941.

able, since the latter was resolved at all costs to prevent the transformation of China into a Japanese colony or dependency. At a deeper level, the American-Japanese conflict was fuelled by the grave economic crisis of 1929-32 in both countries. It flowed from the perception that a long-term solution involved a decisive break with economic isolationism (a shift from growth centered on the home market), and hence the need to achieve for oneself (or deny others) strategic insertion in the world market via hegemony over a substantial part of the world, as a necessary step on the path to world dominance.

So the second act of the imperialist drama unfolded according to the inner logic of the world capitalist system. Once again the stake was the international hegemony of one imperialist power, to be won and maintained by an active combination of military conquest or pressure and economic domination or plunder - the exact mix depending on the relative strength or weakness of the individual contestants, deriving from such inner constraints as the level of economic development and the character of political institutions. On the eve of the Second World War these powers were the USA, Germany, Japan and Britain, with France and Italy playing the role of secondary allies, lacking the strength to be real contenders. It might be objected that the above characterization of the status of WWII is too sweeping and does not correspond to the real course of events, which reveal much more limited ambitions on the part of the warring powers; that one ought to distinguish more sharply between causes and effects, and differentiate the aggressors from those states which entered the war in self-defence. Was not the Second World War simply a concentration of regional conflicts whose origin lay in the peculiarities of German and Japanese politics, inducing a rupture in what otherwise would have been a peaceful evolution of the world economy towards what Kautsky had termed 'ultra-imperialism'? In this view, Japan's drive was limited to the creation of an East-Asian and Pacific zone of influence and German expansionism to parts of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. The British bourgeoisie's desire to retain its imperial possessions can then be cleared of responsibility for Japanese or German militarism, and US goals vis-a-vis Asia and Africa, not to speak of Europe, can be seen as more modest and benign in essence than the policy of armed conquest sponsored by German and Japanese fascism.

However, this objection misunderstands the role which imperialist wars have played in the internationalization of the

understanding of the meaning of the coming war. The struggle for hegemony in the world will be determined by possession of the Russian space. Any idea of a 'European Germany' as long as it does not threaten the interests of the powers of Europe, then dominant position in the world. If the British Empire collapse today through our arms, we would not be interested. Russia would take India, Japan East Asia and America Canada. American imperialism was also conscious of its 'duty' to become the world leader. The decision he (Roosevelt) made in 1940, on his own authority and without clerical calls, involved the commitment of the United States to the assumption of responsibility for nothing less than the leadership of the world.<sup>16</sup> The breakdown of the world economy in the late 1920s, to which the United States had itself generously contributed, and the creation of exclusive trading blocs (the largest of which centered on the British sterling area) imperilled not only America's markets but also its supply of raw materials. For the United States the war was to be the lever which would open the whole of the world market and world resources to American exploitation.<sup>17</sup> Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, put it quite bluntly in 1942: 'Leadership towards a new system of international relationships in trade and other economic affairs will devolve largely upon the United States because of our great economic strength. We should assume this leadership, and the responsibility that goes with it, primarily for reasons of pure national self-interest.'

As for British imperialism, even if it indeed had already chewed off more than it could digest, it by no means ceased jockeying for its own positions. Its intervention in East Africa, mopping up of the Italian colonial empire, liquidation of the French colonies in the Near East, heavy hand laid upon Iran, preparation of a Balkan bloc with the evident purpose of making Greece a stepping stone for the creation of British client states in Eastern Europe replacing the French satellites which had emerged in 1918, various attempts at power politics in Latin America (such as the backdoor arrangement given to Peron against US imperialism) - indicate that the dream of hegemony was still being dreamt in the City, and (albeit) under conditions where the disproportion between ends and means became increasingly pathetic.

In the era of imperialism, even a quest for regional zones of influence presupposes a readiness to fight on a world scale. The logic of this emerges in the military directives and decisions of the

stages. Already in November 1940, the British government's decision to capture the Canary Islands, Azores and West Africa, because of their strategic importance vis-a-vis the USA, Iraq and Iran were the first steps in the conquest of the Caspian operations, and Dvornik extends German war plans as far as the Azores, Iceland, the Azores, the Cape of Dakar were all seen by US strategists as necessary preconditions for the conquest of Europe and a line of defense to be held against possible German attack.<sup>18</sup> Roosevelt was convinced in 1940 that 'if Britain fell, a disastrous war for the United States would be inevitable. (If) Germany would attack the Western hemisphere, probably at first in Latin America, as soon as she assembled a sufficient naval force and transport and cargo fleet (not too long a process with all the shipbuilding facilities of Europe at Germany's disposal) and Japan would go on the rampage in the Pacific.'

To be sure, geographical constraints and military requirements partially dictated these lines of expansion.<sup>19</sup> But underlying these constraints and considerations was the inner logic of imperialism, which can be seen quite clearly in the planning clauses of the warring states. Oil, rubber, copper, nickel, tin, manganese, iron ore, cotton, etc. had to be secured; sea lanes had to be kept open to supply these home; workers and forced labour had to be mobilised, housed and fed; exports had to be expanded and foisted upon reluctant clients; foreign competitors had to be dragged into partnerships or simply absorbed; opponents' exports had to be cut and their populations starved. The war indeed showed itself to be nothing but the continuation of politics by other means.<sup>20</sup>

But if the meaning of the Second World War, like that of its predecessor, can be grasped only in the context of the imperialist drive for world domination, its significance lies in the fact that it was the ultimate test of the relative strength of the competing imperialist states. Its outcome determined the particular pattern of the world accumulation of capital for a whole period. In the world organised by capital based on nation-states, war is *de facto* mechanism for the final resolution of differences. For although military power is not the only kind of pressure which a capitalist state can bring to bear upon its rivals, nevertheless it is the highest form of power; the potential or actual use of armed might to impose its will is the decisive proof of an imperialist state's superiority. Therefore, what we are dealing with here is the capacity of each of the belligerents to

use military force in a sustained way and more successfully than its opponents, which in turn depends on the ability of each state to mobilise all necessary resources, human as well as material, for victory. Consequently, wars on this scale are the supreme test of the solidity of the social order and its economic health, as they are of the political stamina of the ruling classes and their leaderships.

So far as the latter are concerned, the central issue is the ability of the bourgeoisie to reign in its own back yard, above all over its native working class. In the final analysis, imperialist expansion expresses an insatiable thirst for surplus value, its production and realization - the snowball dynamic of capital accumulation. But qualitatively increased surplus-value production is possible only through a specific relationship with wage labour, a subordination of the working class to capital. Hence a strategic integration of the working class in the metropolitan centres is a necessary component of the imperialist countries' ability to pursue the struggle for world dominance. The world that emerged from the 1914-1918 war was at least partially shaped by the unprecedented rise in working-class self-organisation and self-confidence, especially in Europe but also in the USA, during the quarter century that preceded it. The attitude of the working class to imperialism was therefore of importance not only to the ruling classes, but also to the future of the working class itself. The historic debate which took place among the parties of the Second International between 1907 and 1917 - a debate which started before the war (though at a time when the warring alliances were already in place) and continued right through it - linked the question of the forthcoming war to a wider discussion on whether the workers' organisations should be instruments of reform of the bourgeois order or its great diggers.<sup>21</sup> When the war started and after initial nationalist euphoria had evaporated amidst hunger, death and destruction, the social trust broke under its impact right across the continent.

Mutinies in the French, German, Austrian and Russian armies; hunger marches and strikes in factories; the overthrow of Tsarism in Russia; the dissolution of Austria-Hungary; the overthrow of the Ottoman sultanate; the abdication of the German Kaiser; the advent of revolution in the crises of Central, East and Southeastern Europe; and finally the success of the Bolshevik-led revolution in Russia - these represent the many varied attempts by the exploited populations of this part of Europe and Asia to find alternative solutions to capitalism's intensifying structural crisis and to the war-prose anarchy of the international order established by the







# What if we transform paragraphs into messages

Capitalism implies competition. With the emergence of large corporations and cartels - i.e. the advent of monopoly capitalism - this competition assumed a new dimension. It became qualitatively more politico-economic, and therefore military-economic. What was at stake was no longer the fate of businesses representing some tens of thousands of pounds or hundreds of thousands of dollars. At stake were industrial empires, whose assets ran into hundreds of millions of pounds, dollars, francs and their armies of workers. The competition was now for the world market, for access to the raw materials and the sources of cheap labour. The competition was now for the world market, for access to the raw materials and the sources of cheap labour. The competition was now for the world market, for access to the raw materials and the sources of cheap labour.

## 1. The Stakes

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It is not surprising that the first move in questioning the status quo should have been made by Germany, which had assumed the industrial leadership of Europe and hence was in a position to challenge a colonial share-out favourable to Britain and France by force of arms. The prospect of the continent's unification under German domination, with all its implications for the future of the colonies and other dependent states, was a matter of concern not only to those most immediately affected, like Britain, France or Russia, but also for the non-European powers: Japan and the United States. In the event, US intervention on the side of the Entente proved decisive in the defeat of Germany.

Yet World War One in no way 'solved' the growing contradiction between economic and political world. The capitalist world, Germany was defeated, but not so decisively as to eliminate the race for world leadership. And the war had opened the door for a new arrival: socialist revolution. The victory and dissolution of Bolshevik power in Russia; the revolutionary ferment leading to the appearance of Soviet power in the other defeated countries and Italy; the generalized revolution against the

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understanding of the meaning of the coming war was equally clear. The struggle for hegemony in the world will be decided for Europe by the Russian war. Any idea of a Russian policy is ridiculous (for Germany) as long as it does not dominate the continent. . . . If we are masters of Europe, then we shall have the dominant position in the world. If the (British) Empire were to collapse today through our arms, we would not be its heirs, since Russia would take India, Japan East Asia and America Canada.

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It is instructive to look beyond strictly European imperialist relationship developing between China, which would eventually lead to the Pacific War, and the USA collaborated in the suppression of China. In 1905 the Russo-Japanese peace treaty gave the USA a free hand in the Far East. Britain and the other two great powers in the Far East, Britain and France, were excluded by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Hence the fact that Germany imperialism was finally crushed by the USA in 1918 was not a coincidence. It was the result of a course of action that had been planned for years. The target of German imperialism 'imposed' on her by her own actions was the Japanese war machine, the most powerful country in the world, Japan's ally in the Far East. The all-out war it unleashed against the USA inevitably led to the

Second World War's opening stages. Already in November 1940, Hitler's Directive No. 18 mentions the need to capture the Canary and Cape Verde islands, the Azores and West Africa, because of their strategic importance vis-a-vis the USA. Iraq and Iran were mentioned as further goals of the Caucasian operations, and Directive No. 24 of 5 March 1941 extends German war plans as far as Australia. Echoing these concerns, Iceland, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands and the port of Dakar were all seen by US strategists as necessary for the reconquest of Europe and a line of defense to be held against possible German attack. Roosevelt was convinced in 1940 that 'if Britain fell, a disastrous war for the United States would be inevitable. If Germany would attack the Western hemisphere, probably at first in Latin America, as soon as she assembled a sufficient naval force and transport and cargo fleet (not too long a process with all the shipbuilding facilities of Europe at Germany's disposal) and Japan would go on the rampage in the Pacific.'

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So the second act of the imperialist drama unfolded according to the inner logic of the world capitalist system. Once again the stake was the international hegemony of one imperialist power, to be won and maintained by an active combination of military conquest or pressure and economic domination or plunder - the exact mix depending on the relative strength or weakness of the individual contestants, deriving from such inner constraints as the level of economic development and the character of political institutions. On the eve of the Second World War these powers were the USA, Germany, Japan and Britain, with France and Italy playing the role of secondary allies, lacking the strength to be real contenders.

It might be objected that the above characterization of the stakes of WWII is too sweeping and does not correspond to the real course of events, which reveal much more limited ambitions on the part of the warring powers; that one ought to distinguish more sharply between causes and effects, and differentiate the aggressors from those states which entered the war in self-defence. Was not the Second World War simply a concentration of regional conflicts whose origin lay in the particularities of German and Japanese politics, inducing a rupture in what otherwise would have been a peaceful evolution of the world economy towards what Kautsky had termed 'ultra-imperialism'? In this view, Japan's drive was limited to the creation of an East-Asian and Pacific zone of influence and German expansionism to parts of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. The British bourgeoisie's desire to retain its imperial possessions can then be viewed as a means to the end of Japanese or German militarism, and US goals vis-a-vis Asia and Africa, not to speak of Europe, can be seen as more modest and benign in essence than the policy of armed conquest sponsored by German and Japanese fascism.

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18  
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So far as the latter are concerned, the central issue is the ability of the bourgeoisie to reign in its own back yard, above all over its native working class. In the final analysis, imperialist expansion expresses an insatiable thirst for surplus value, its production and realization - the snowball dynamic of capital accumulation. But qualitatively increased surplus-value production is possible only through a specific relationship with wage labour, a subordination of the working class to capital. Hence a strategic integration of the working class in the metropolitan centres is a necessary component of the imperialist countries' ability to pursue the struggle for world dominance. The world that emerged from the 1914-1918 war was at least partially shaped by the unprecedented rise in working-class self-organization and self-confidence, especially in Europe but also in the USA, during the quarter century that preceded it. The attitude of the working class to imperialism was therefore of importance not only to the ruling classes, but also to the future of the working class itself. The historic debate which took place among the parties of the Second International between 1907 and 1917 - a debate which started before the war (though at a time when the warring alliances were already in place) and continued right through it - linked the question of the forthcoming war to a wider discussion on whether the workers' organisations should be instruments of reform of the bourgeois order or its grave-diggers. When the war started, and after initial nationalist euphoria had evaporated amidst hunger, death and destruction, the social trust broke under its impact right across the continent.

Mutinies in the French, German, Austrian and Russian armies; hunger marches and strikes in factories; the overthrow of Tsarism in Russia; the dissolution of Austria-Hungary; the overthrow of the Ottoman sultanate; the abdication of the German Kaiser; the advent of revolution in the cities of Central, East and Southeastern Europe; and finally the success of the Bolshevik-led revolution in Russia - these represent the many varied attempts by the exploited populations of this part of Europe and Asia to find alternative solutions to capitalism's intensifying structural crisis and to the war-prone anarchy of the international order established by the






1. The Stakes

Capitalism implies competition. With the emergence of large colonial empires...

vPub ARS

1.2 - Power Coalition

World Colonial Empires, 1900



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The creation of colonial empires following the international thrust of capital proved to be only a temporary answer to the problem of the growing disproportion between development of the productive forces and the political form within which this development had taken place : the nation-state. Given the poverty and low growth rates of the colonies, their demand for manufactured goods was inherently limited, they were hardly a substitute for the lucrative markets to be found in the industrial countries themselves, whose systematic closure - via the high tariffs on imported goods and capital increasingly imposed by the end of the nineteenth century - accelerated the colonial drive. At the same time the fact that the world had become divided relatively early on, to the especial advantage of the Western rim of the European continent, meant that later industrial powers (USA, Germany, Russia, Japan) had little space to expand overseas. Their prodigious development issued in a powerful challenge to the existing international arrangements. It upset the constant balance of political and economic power. The growing conflict between the burgeoning productive forces and the prevailing political structures could less and less be contained by conventional diplomacy or local military skirmishes. The power coalitions which this conflict fostered merely exacerbated it, ensuring that it would reach an explosive point. The explosion occurred with the First World War.

It is not surprising that the first move in questioning the status quo should have been made by Germany, which had assumed the industrial leadership of Europe and hence was in a position to challenge a colonial share-out favourable to Britain and France by force of arms. The prospect of the continent's unification under German domination, with all its implications for the future of the colonies and other dependent states, was a matter of concern not only to those most immediately affected, like Britain, France or Russia, but also for the non-European powers: Japan and the United States. In the event, US intervention on the side of the Entente proved decisive in the defeat of Germany.

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American imperialism was also conscious of its 'duty' to become the world leader. The decision by Roosevelt made in 1900, on his own authority and without clerical calls, involved the commitment of the United States to the assumption of responsibility for nothing less than the leadership of the world. The breakdown of the world economy in the late 1920s, to which the United States had itself generously contributed, and the creation of exclusive trading blocs (the largest of which centered on the British sterling area) imperilled not only America's markets but also its supply of raw materials. For the United States the war was to be the lever which would open the whole of the world market and world resources to American exploitation. Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, put it quite bluntly in 1942: 'Leadership towards a new system of international relationships in trade and other economic affairs will devolve largely upon the United States because of our great economic strength. We should assume the leadership, and the responsibility that goes with it, primarily for reasons of pure national self-interest.'

As for British imperialism, even if it indeed had already chafed off more than it could digest, it by no means ceased jockeying for more positions. Its intervention in East Africa, stepping up of the Indian colonial empire, liquidation of the French colonies in the Near East, heavy hand laid upon Iran, preparation of a Balkan invasion with the evident purpose of making Greece a stepping stone for the creation of British client states in Eastern Europe replacing the French satellites which had emerged in 1919, various attempts at power politics in Latin America (such as the backing of the fascist regime in Brazil) - all these were part of the British policy given to France against US imperialism.

Equally, there is not the slightest proof of any limitation on the war aims of Japan, Germany or the USA, the real challengers of the status quo in the Second World War. Very early on the Tanaka Memorandum established that for the Japanese army, the conquest of China was only a stepping-stone to the conquest of world hegemony, which would be achieved after crushing US resistance. Indeed, Japan's alliance with Germany could be only temporary, and remained fragile and untrustworthy through the war, for it was seen as a provisional truce with a future enemy. Hitler's influence presupposes a readiness to fight on a world scale. The logic of this emerges in the military directives and decisions of the

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The point has been made many times that the Second World War was a logical and inevitable outcome of World War One. But the link between the two is commonly reduced to the anti-German clauses of the Versailles Treaty, and especially the British policy of reparations on which the French bourgeoisie was particularly insistent. In truth, although the terms of the peace settlement certainly helped to exacerbate the political, military and above all economic conflicts that dominated the twenties and thirties and paved the way to WWII, they did not create these problems - any more than 'naïve' planning by the Austrian, Russian, German or French general staffs caused WWI.

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
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able, since the latter was resolved at all costs to prevent the transformation of China into a Japanese colony or dependency. At a deeper level, the American-Japanese conflict was fuelled by the grave economic crisis of 1929-32 in both countries. It flowed from the perception that a long-term solution involved a decisive break with economic isolationism (a shift from growth centered on the home market), and hence the need to achieve for oneself (or deny others) strategic insertion in the world market via hegemony over a substantial part of the world, as a necessary step on the path to world dominance.

In the second act of the imperialist drama unfolded according to the inner logic of the world capitalist system. Once again the stake was the international hegemony of one imperialist power, to be won and maintained by an active combination of military conquest or pressure and economic domination or glomeration - the exact mix depending on the relative strength or weakness of the individual contestants, deriving from such inner constraints as the level of economic development and the character of political institutions. On the eve of the Second World War these powers were the USA, Germany, Japan and Britain, with France and Italy playing the role of secondary allies, lacking the strength to be real contenders.

It might be objected that the above characterizations of the main events of WWII is too sweeping and does not correspond to the real course of events, which reveal much more limited ambitions on the part of the warring powers; that one ought to distinguish more sharply between causes and effects, and differentiate the aggressors from those states which entered the war in self-defence. Was not the Second World War simply a concentration of regional conflicts whose origin lay in the peculiarities of German and Japanese politics, indicating a rupture in what otherwise would have been a peaceful evolution of the world economy towards a more or less limited to the creation of an East-Asian and a West-European sphere of influence and German expansionism to parts of Africa and the Middle East. The British had to retain its imperial possessions can then be explained as a reaction to Japanese or German militarism, and US intervention in Europe and Africa, not to speak of Europe, can be seen as a necessary response to the policy of appeasement towards Germany and Japanese fascism.

However, this objection must be rejected. The imperialist wars have played



use military force in a vain attempt to contain the Japanese, which in turn would mobilize all necessary resources to ensure the final victory. Consequently, wars of this kind are not the result of the solidity of the social order and the stability of the political structure of the ruling classes, but rather of the contradictions between the bourgeoisie to reign in its own back yard, and the need to expand its markets for raw materials and outlets for its surplus value. In the final analysis, imperialist expansion expresses an insatiable thirst for surplus value, its production and realization - the snowball dynamic of capital accumulation. But qualitatively increased surplus-value production is possible only through a specific relationship with wage labour, a subordination of the working class to capital. Hence a strategic integration of the working class in the metropolitan centres is a necessary component of the imperialist countries' ability to pursue the struggle for world dominance. The world that emerged from the 1914-1918 war was at least partially shaped by the unprecedented rise in working-class self-organization and self-confidence, especially in Europe but also in the USA, during the quarter century that preceded it. The attitude of the working class to imperialism was therefore of importance not only to the ruling classes, but also to the future of the working class itself. The historic debate which took place among the parties of the Second International between 1902 and 1917 - a debate which started before the war (though at a time when the warring alliances were already in place) and continued right through it - linked the question of the forthcoming war to a wider discussion on whether the workers' organisations should be instruments of reform of the bourgeois order or its grave-diggers. When the war started, and after initial spontaneous explosions had evaporated amidst hunger, death and destruction, the social trust broke under its impact right across the continent.


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We can attach images...

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
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
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# The Stakes

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1.2 - Power Coalition


World Colonial Empires, 1900



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14  
able, since the latter was resolved at all costs to prevent the transformation of China into a Japanese colony or dependency. At a deeper level, the American-Japanese conflict was fuelled by the grave economic crisis of 1929-32 in both countries. It flowed from the perception that a long-term solution involved a decisive break with economic isolationism (a shift from growth centered on the home market), and hence the need to achieve for oneself (or deny others) strategic positions in the world market via hegemony over a substantial part of the world, as a necessary step on the path to world dominance.  
So the second act of the imperialist drama unfolded according to the inner logic of the world capitalist system. Once again the stake was the international hegemony of one imperialist power, to be won and maintained by an active combination of military conquest or pressure and economic domination or gladiator — the exact mix depending on the relative strength or weakness of the individual contestants, deriving from such inner constraints as the level of economic development and the character of political institutions. On the eve of the Second World War these powers were the USA, Germany, Japan and Britain, with France and Italy playing the role of secondary allies, lacking the strength to be real contenders. It might be objected that the above characterizations of the main events of WW II is too sweeping and does not correspond to the real course of events, which reveal much more limited ambitions on the part of the warring powers; that one ought to distinguish more sharply between causes and effects, and differentiate the aggressions from those states which entered the war in self-defence.  
Second World War simply a concentration of the forces of whose origin lay in the peculiarities of German imperialist politics, indicating a rupture in what otherwise would have been the peaceful evolution of the world economy towards a new stage which had termed 'ultra-imperialism'. In this view, Japan's drive limited to the creation of an East-Asian and Pacific empire, and German influence and German expansionism to parts of Africa and the Middle East. The British had to retain its imperial possessions can then be seen as a necessary step for Japanese or German militarism, and US goals in Asia and Africa, not to spread of Europe, can be seen as a necessary step to benign in essence than the policy of American imperialism.  
However, this objection misses the point that the growing disproportion between development of the productive forces and the political form within which this development had taken place: the nation-state. Given the poverty and low growth rates of the colonies, their demand for manufactured goods was inherently limited; they were hardly a substitute for the lucrative markets to be found in the industrial countries themselves, whose systematic closure — via the high tariffs on imported goods and capital increasingly imposed by the end of the nineteenth century — accelerated the colonial drive. At the same time the fact that the world had become divided relatively early on, to the especial advantage of the Western rim of the European continent, meant that later industrial powers (USA, Germany, Russia, Japan) had little space to expand overseas. Their prodigious development issued in a powerful challenge to the existing territorial arrangements. It upset the concomitant balance of political and economic power. The growing conflict between the burgeoning productive forces and the prevailing political structures could less and less be contained by conventional diplomacy or local military skirmishes. The power coalitions which this conflict fostered merely exacerbated it, ensuring that it would reach an explosion-point. The explosion occurred with the First World War.  
It is not surprising that the first move in questioning the status quo should have been made by Germany, which had assumed the industrial leadership of Europe and hence was in a position to challenge a colonial share-out favourable to Britain and France by force of arms. The prospect of the continent's unification under German domination, with all its implications for the future of the colonies and other dependent states, was a matter of concern not only to those most immediately affected, like Britain, France or Russia, but also for the non-European powers: Japan and the United States. In the event, US intervention on the side of the Entente proved decisive in the defeat of Germany.  
Yet World War One is no way 'solved' the growing contradiction between economy and politics within the capitalist world. True, Germany was defeated, but not so decisively as to eliminate her from the race for world leadership. And the war had opened the door for a new arrival: socialist revolution. The victory and consolidation of Bolshevik power in Russia, the revolutionary ferment leading to the appearance of Soviet power in the other defeated countries and Italy; the generalized revolution against the war



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Equally, there is not the slightest proof of any limitation on the war aims of Japan, Germany or the USA, the real challenges of the status quo in the Second World War. Very early on the Tanaka Memorandum established that for the Japanese army, the conquest of China was only a stepping-stone to the conquest of world hegemony, which would be achieved after crushing US resistance. Indeed, Japan's alliance with Germany could be only temporary, and remained fragile and untrustworthy through the war, for it was seen as a provisional truce with a future enemy. Hitler's

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understand...  
The struggle...  
... If we are to...  
... If the (British) Empire were to collapse today through our arms, we would not be its heir, since Russia would take India, Japan East Asia and America Canada...  
American imperialism was also conscious of its 'duty' to become the world leader. The decision by (Bismarck) in 1890, on his own authority and without clerical calls, involved the commitment of the United States to the assumption of responsibility for nothing less than the leadership of the world...  
The breakdown of the world economy in the late 1920s, to which the United States had itself generously contributed, and the creation of exclusive trading blocs (the largest of which covered on the British sterling area) imperilled not only America's markets but also its supply of raw materials. For the United States the war was to be the lever which would open the whole of the world market and world resources to American exploitation. Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, put it quite bluntly in 1942: 'Leadership towards a new system of international relationships in trade and other economic affairs will devolve largely upon the United States because of our great economic strength. We should assume the leadership, and the responsibility that goes with it, primarily for reasons of pure national self-interest.'  
As for British imperialism, even if it indeed had already chafed off more than it could digest, it by no means craved jockeying for more positions. Its intervention in East Africa, stepping up to the Indian colonial empire, liquidation of the French colonies in the Near East, heavy hand laid upon Iraq, preparation of a Balkan invasion with the evident purpose of making Greece a stepping stone for the creation of British client states in Eastern Europe replacing the French satellites which had emerged in 1918, various attempts at power politics in Latin America (such as the backing encouragement given to Przewozski against US intervention in Poland) — all these were not the result of any desire to expand the British Empire, but rather the result of the logic of the situation. In the event, the British Empire's influence presupposes a readiness to fight on a world scale. The logic of this emerges in the military directives and decisions of the

19  
The Meaning of the Second World War 19  
which produced a massive shift to the left in the victor countries themselves at its close — these changed the whole meaning of international warfare for the bourgeois. From the onset the new arrangement between victors and vanquished was overshadowed by the desire of the ruling classes to prevent the spread of revolution, especially to Germany, America, British and even French imperialists did not dare completely to disarm their German competitors, but the German working class take power. Indeed, between November 1918 and October 1923, the Reichswehr was the only real force defending the weakened capitalist order in Germany. The construction of Versailles was that the victors wanted to weaken German capitalism without really disarming it and while keeping its industrial power intact. This made its military comeback inevitable.  
The point has been made many times that the Second World War was a logical and inevitable outcome of World War One. But the link between the two is commonly reduced to the anti-German clauses of the Versailles Treaty, and especially the British policy of reparations on which the French bourgeoisie was particularly insistent. In truth, although the terms of the peace settlement certainly helped to exacerbate the political, military and above all economic conflicts that dominated the twenties and thirties and paved the way to WWII, they did not create these problems — any more than 'naïve' planning by the Austrian, Russian, German or French general staffs caused WWI.  
In this respect it is instructive to look beyond strictly European politics to the developments between China, Japan and the USA in the Pacific

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use military force in a...  
... the bourgeoisie to reign in its own back yard, and...  
... native working class. In the final analysis, imperialist expansion expresses an insatiable thirst for surplus value, which seeks place and realization — the snowball dynamic of capital accumulation and qualitatively increased surplus-value production — through a specific relationship with wage labour of the working class to capital. Hence a strong working class in the metropolitan centres is a...  
... of the imperialist countries' ability to pursue it...  
... dominance. The world that emerged from the...  
... at least partially shaped by the unprecedented...  
... class self-organization and self-confidence, a...  
... but also in the USA, during the quarter century...  
... The attitude of the working class to imperialism...  
... of importance not only to the ruling classes, but also to the future of the working class itself. The historic debate which took place among the parties of the Second International between 1902 and 1917 — a debate which started before the war (though at a time when the warring alliances were already in place) and continued right through it — linked the question of the forthcoming war to a wider discussion on whether the workers' organization should be instruments of reform of the bourgeois order or its grave-diggers. When the war started, and after initial revolutionary euphoria had evaporated amidst hunger, death and destruction, the social trust broke under its impact right across the continent.  
Mutinies in the French, German, Austrian and Russian armies; hunger marches and strikes in factories; the overthrow of Tsarism in Russia; the dissolution of Austria-Hungary; the overthrow of the Ottoman sultanate; the abdication of the German Kaiser; the advent of revolution in the cases of Central, East and Southeastern Europe; and finally the success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia — these represent the many varied attempts by the exploited nations of this part of Europe and Asia to find alternative solutions to capitalism's intensifying structural crisis and to the war-prone anarchy of the international order established by the




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
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
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## Independent self-control, self-reflection, and self-rumination: A path model for predicting happiness

IRINA ELLIOTT\* & SUZANNE COOPER\*

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**Abstract**  
A central theme of happiness research is the mediating impact of cognitive and motivational processes on the individual's perceptions of their happiness. This study investigated a path model with five cognitive variables, self-reflection and self-rumination as mediating factors between an independent self-control and happiness. Our findings indicate that more than 100 participants completed a questionnaire designed to measure subjective happiness, independent self-control, self-reflection and self-rumination. The results of this study suggest that more than 100 participants with an independent self-control are associated with greater happiness. The results also indicated that self-reflection has the potential to both increase and decrease happiness mediated by self-reflection and self-rumination. The study suggests that although meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for individuals who do not enjoy high levels of happiness, the path of self-reflection to a state of high self-rumination which has detrimental consequences for happiness.

The pursuit of happiness is central to human existence. Research in happiness has been conducted by the emergence of positive psychology with its focus on the evidence of human nature (Seligman & Peterson, 2001). The general consensus is that although to some degree objective situational factors (such as income, health, age, and marital status) influence happiness, it is primarily subjective, ultimately, happiness is a subjective phenomenon, with subjective feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and attitudes. The subjective view most frequently used in the literature is the self-report method, that the structure itself (Ajzen, 2001; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Haidt, Wilson, & Durr, 2004; Myers, 2000).

**A central theme of happiness**  
The subjective perspective on happiness is reflected in one of the most developments in research on subjective happiness (Diener, 2000). According to a central theme, happiness is determined by what people think of their experiences, that is, the way they conceive and interpret the world around them (Lyubomirsky, 2001). In this regard, a central theme of happiness research is the role of hedonic beliefs, cognitive and motivational processes as mediating the effects of person and situation factors (Seligman & Peterson, 2001). The general consensus is that although to some degree objective situational factors (such as income, health, age, and marital status) influence happiness, it is primarily subjective, ultimately, happiness is a subjective phenomenon, with subjective feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and attitudes. The subjective view most frequently used in the literature is the self-report method, that the structure itself (Ajzen, 2001; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Haidt, Wilson, & Durr, 2004; Myers, 2000).

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Similarly, happy individuals have been found to be less prone to engage in self-reflection, or to think about and analyze one's thoughts, feelings, and emotions of their actions (Lyubomirsky, 2001). However, this research has been largely limited to studies who display extremely high or extremely low levels of happiness. Lyubomirsky and Ross (1999) demonstrated that when happy people were instructed to self-reflect, their behavior mirrored the behavior of unhappy individuals, whereas when unhappy individuals were prevented from engaging in self-reflection, their behavior mirrored the behavior of happy people. This suggests that similar to the hedonic consequences of self-rumination mentioned above, the hedonic consequences of self-reflection may be determined to the individual's perceptions of their happiness.

### Path model and hypothesis

Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that although independent and interdependent self-construals are predominant in individualistic and collectivistic cultures, respectively, individuals within a given society can be less or more independent or interdependent. (The distinction between individualistic and collectivistic societies refers to the extent to which the value of the individual takes precedence over, or is sacrificed to the needs of others.) Markus, Houtman, Ellis, Johnson, and Hooley (1996) demonstrated that independent and interdependent self-construals are two separate constructs and suggested that the predictive capacities of these two variables should be assessed separately.

Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that for those with an independent self-construal knowledge about the self is more important and elaborated than knowledge about the other, one's internal abilities, feelings, and thoughts are thought highly accessible to memory. Moreover, for those with an independent self-construal, in comparison to those with an interdependent self-construal, self-esteem is based on internal attributes, which facilitates motivation to obtain more self-knowledge. This suggests that individuals with a highly developed independent self-construal may be more prone to focus on themselves when reflecting on their life. For example, in Baumeister, Pals, Schmeckel, and Tauer's (2007) study, the shift in perception of pre-adolescent behavior in low adolescents as a result of self-reflection was greater for individuals who emphasized the importance of self-knowledge over relationships with others. Therefore, a higher level of an independent self-construal as an individual variable may lead to greater self-reflection.

Markus and Kitayama (1991) posit that for those with a highly developed self-construal the path of self-reflection to self-rumination may be determined by the individual's perceptions of their happiness. From the perspective of a central theme, the mediating impact of cognitive and motivational processes on happiness is related to the hedonic consequences of these processes for the individual's self-esteem.

In this regard, the present study was designed to investigate the hedonic consequences associated with the five cognitive variables, self-reflection and self-rumination as mediating factors between an independent self-control and happiness.



Figure 1. Path model predicting subjective happiness

invested to maintain a positive view of the self, they engage in self-reflection to do so. For those with an independent construal a positive view of the self involves seeking information that enhances attitudes towards their self-esteem based on an ability to capture more quality. In contrast, happy individuals who are more positive should be less oriented to the independent self, as the self-esteem of those with the independent self is based on the ability to fit in and to maintain harmony in relationships with others. This suggests that individuals with a highly developed independent self-construal will be motivated to avoid dwelling on the negative as related to the self. Therefore, a higher level of an independent self-construal as an individual variable may lead to low self-rumination.

**Method**  
**Participants**  
Participants were 121 residents of Southampton in Central Quantified Journals, n = 97, male, n = 54, female, n = 2. Participants ranged in age from 19-50 years (M = 34.50, SD = 10.50). Table 1 presents the age group, education level, marital status, and income level of the participants.

Demographic variable	%	n
Age		
18-24	28.0	35
25-34	32.0	40
35-44	32.0	40
45-54	2.0	3
55 and over	2.0	3
Gender		
Male	27.3	34
Female	72.7	90
Married	7.4	9
Education		
Primary	2.6	3
1-4 year secondary school	6.6	8
5-7 year secondary school	33.1	41
University	57.6	71
Employment		
Unemployed	2.6	3
Married	7.4	9
Single	62.8	78
Divorced	18.2	23
Widowed	4.1	5
Retired	4.3	5
Homeless	11.6	14
Worked	71.9	90
Personal net		
Less than 10k	18.2	23
10k-20k	24.0	30
20k-30k	33.9	42
30k-40k	20.7	26
40k-50k	2.6	3
More than 50k	17.5	22
Income		
18-24	28.0	35
25-34	32.0	40
35-44	32.0	40
45-54	2.0	3
55 and over	2.0	3

## Method

**Participants**  
Participants were 121 residents of Southampton in Central Quantified Journals, n = 97, male, n = 54, female, n = 2. Participants ranged in age from 19-50 years (M = 34.50, SD = 10.50). Table 1 presents the age group, education level, marital status, and income level of the participants.

## Measures

**Independent self-control**  
The independent self-control scale consists of 20 items that measure the extent to which individuals believe they are responsible for their own actions and outcomes. The scale is a self-report measure of independent self-control, with scores ranging from 1 (low independent self-control) to 5 (high independent self-control). The scale is a self-report measure of independent self-control, with scores ranging from 1 (low independent self-control) to 5 (high independent self-control).

## Procedure

The data for the present study were collected from a questionnaire survey conducted in Southampton, England. The questionnaire was distributed to participants via email and paper copies. The questionnaire was distributed to participants via email and paper copies.

## Results

**Independent self-control, self-reflection, and self-rumination**  
This study provides empirical support for a central theme of happiness research is the mediating impact of cognitive and motivational processes on the individual's perceptions of their happiness. Our findings indicate that more than 100 participants completed a questionnaire designed to measure subjective happiness, independent self-control, self-reflection and self-rumination. The results of this study suggest that more than 100 participants with an independent self-control are associated with greater happiness. The results also indicated that self-reflection has the potential to both increase and decrease happiness mediated by self-reflection and self-rumination. The study suggests that although meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for individuals who do not enjoy high levels of happiness, the path of self-reflection to a state of high self-rumination which has detrimental consequences for happiness.

## Discussion

The results of the present study suggest that more than 100 participants with an independent self-control are associated with greater happiness. The results also indicated that self-reflection has the potential to both increase and decrease happiness mediated by self-reflection and self-rumination. The study suggests that although meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for individuals who do not enjoy high levels of happiness, the path of self-reflection to a state of high self-rumination which has detrimental consequences for happiness.

## Conclusion

The results of the present study suggest that more than 100 participants with an independent self-control are associated with greater happiness. The results also indicated that self-reflection has the potential to both increase and decrease happiness mediated by self-reflection and self-rumination. The study suggests that although meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for individuals who do not enjoy high levels of happiness, the path of self-reflection to a state of high self-rumination which has detrimental consequences for happiness.

## Acknowledgements

This study was conducted by the first author under the supervision of the co-author and partial fulfillment of the requirements of a Bachelor of Psychology. The first author wishes to thank Professor Karen Reiss at Central Quantified University for her support throughout the period in which this article was written. Special thanks to Dr. Robert Elliott, John Mann, and Bruce Elliott for their contributions to data collection for this study.

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- Abstract
- Background
- Method
- Results
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgements





# Journals

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## Independent self-control, self-reflection, and self-rumination: A path model for predicting happiness

IRINA ELLIOTT\* & SUZANNE COOPER\*

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**Abstract**  
A central theme of happiness research is the mediating impact of cognitive and motivational processes on the individual's perceptions of their happiness. This study investigated a path model with the two cognitive variables, self-reflection and self-rumination as mediating factors between an independent self-control and happiness. One hundred and twenty-three participants completed a questionnaire designed to measure subjective happiness, independent self-control, self-reflection and self-rumination. The general conclusion was that independent self-control was not found to be related to an independent self-control. A higher independent self-control was associated with greater happiness. The results also indicated that self-reflection led the greatest to both normal and extreme levels of happiness. The study suggests that although meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for individuals who do not enjoy high levels of happiness, the path of self-reflection to that of a more joyful self-rumination which has detrimental consequences for happiness.

The pursuit of happiness is central to human existence. Recently, research on happiness has been revitalized by the emergence of positive psychology with its focus on the evidence of human nature (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2001). The general consensus is that although to some degree objective situational factors (such as income, health, age, and marital status) are related to happiness, the most important, the positive association between self-rumination (which is, they have the potential to affect positive or negative consequences for a number of cognitive and motivational processes. Subsequent research not only supported this assumption (Chen, Nelson, & McClelland, 1998; Eastwood, 2000; Furr, Malhotra, & Borkowski, 2005) but also indicated that these differences in cognitive and motivational processes may be related to subjective well-being (Carver, Gross, & Morris, 2005; Ryan & Brown, 2007). This suggests that the distinction between independent and interdependent self-control can be a source of individual differences in cognitive and motivational processes, which, in turn, influences individual differences in happiness. From the perspective of a control theory, the mediating impact of cognitive and motivational processes on happiness is related to the hedonic consequences associated with the individual's self-control.

In this respect, the present study was designed to investigate the hedonic consequences associated with the two cognitive variables, self-reflection and self-rumination as mediating factors between an independent self-control and happiness. Another aim of this study was to assess the direct and indirect influence of self-reflection on subjective happiness. For these purposes a path model as presented in Figure 1 was constructed.

Similarly, happy individuals have been found to be less prone to engage in self-reflection, or to think about and analyze one's thoughts, feelings, and emotions of their actions (Lyubomirsky, 2001). However, these experimental studies involving college students who display extremely high or extremely low levels of happiness, Lyubomirsky and Ross (1999) demonstrated that when happy people were asked to self-reflect, their behavior matched the behavior of unhappy individuals, whereas when unhappy individuals were presented from engaging in self-reflection, their behavior matched the behavior of happy people. This suggests that similar to the hedonic consequences of self-rumination mentioned above, the hedonic consequences of self-reflection may be determined to the individual's perception of their happiness.

The question raised in this study is which personality characteristics that predispose people to self-reflect or self-ruminate. The answer to this question may reside in differences between independent and interdependent self-control. Individuals in terms of how they see themselves (independent from others or connected to others). These differences are related to the distinction between independent and interdependent self-control (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that for those with an independent self-control knowledge about the self is more important and elaborated than knowledge about the other, one's internal abilities, beliefs, and characteristics are often highly accessible to memory. Moreover, for those with an independent self-control, in comparison to those with an interdependent self-control, self-control is based on internal attributes, which facilitates motivation to obtain more self-knowledge. This suggests that individuals with a highly developed independent self-control may be more prone to focus on themselves when reflecting on their life. For example, in Ryan, Pals, Schmeckel, and Pals (2007) study, the shift in perception of pre-social behavior to less altruistic as a result of self-reflection was greater for individuals who emphasized the importance of self-knowledge over relationships with others. Therefore, a higher level of an independent self-control as an individual variable may lead to greater self-reflection.

Markus and Kitayama (1991) point out that although people with both self-control are



Figure 1. Path model predicting subjective happiness

involved to maintain a positive view of the self, they employ different strategies to do so. For those with an independent control a positive view of the self involves seeking information that enhances attention to their self-control as based on an ability to express inner qualities. In contrast, happy self-reflectors that are more positive should be less concerned by the interdependent self, as the self-control of those with the interdependent self is based on the ability to fit in and to maintain harmony in relationships with others. This suggests that individuals with a highly developed independent self-control will be motivated to avoid dwelling on the negative as related to the self. Therefore, a higher level of an independent self-control as an individual variable may lead to less self-rumination.

The role of the self-control process (the propensity to attend to one's thoughts and feelings) in psychological well-being appears to be controversial in research literature (Tregal & Campbell, 1999). On the one hand, studies indicate that the self-control process promotes greater self-esteem and more accurate self-knowledge (Stice & Brown, 1997), which is considered essential for psychological growth. On the other hand, the self-control process has been found to be associated with greater levels of depression, anxiety, and neuroticism (Quasman, 2004; Tregal & Campbell, 1999), which is considered a hindrance to the self-control process.

Attributing clear-cut positive outcomes to self-reflection, however, contradicts the findings of experimental studies on happiness mentioned above. In addition, Ryan et al. (1997) demonstrated that self-reflection can undermine altruistic behavior. Moreover, the clear-cut independence of self-control and rumination process appears to be questionable considering that as a number of experimental studies concerning rumination and psychological well-being, self-rumination was induced through generic self-reflection (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). In a similar vein, a study reported by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1997) suggests a possible causal link between self-reflection, self-rumination, and psychological well-being with self-reflection leading to self-rumination over time and as a result to greater depressed mood. Therefore, greater self-reflection may be associated with greater self-rumination.

Thus, based on the distinction between independent and interdependent self-control and previous research concerning self-reflection and self-rumination with subjective happiness and well-being, it was hypothesized that (a) a higher independent self-control would be associated with greater self-reflection and less self-rumination, (b) greater self-reflection would be associated with greater self-rumination and less happiness, and (c) greater self-rumination would lead to less happiness.

### Method

**Participants**  
Participants were 123 residents of Rockhampton in Central Queensland (Australia,  $n = 97$ , male,  $n = 34$ , female,  $n = 2$ ). Participants ranged in age from 19-80 years ( $M = 34.50$ ,  $SD = 19.10$ ). Table 1 presents the age group, education level, annual income, marital status, and income level of the participants.

### Measures

The Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) assesses the extent to which individuals consider themselves happy and consists of four items with 7-point Likert-type response format.

Table 1. Demographic data of participants

Demographic variable	%	n
Age		
18-24 years	18.8	15
25-34 years	20.3	17
35-44 years	18.8	15
45-54 years	11.4	9
55-64 years	11.4	9
65-74 years	11.4	9
75-80 years	11.4	9
Gender		
Male	21.7	18
Female	78.3	64
Married	1.6	1
Education		
Primary school	2.4	2
1-1 year secondary school	4.7	4
1-2 year secondary school	10.3	8
3-4 year secondary school	13.7	11
University	11.4	9
Postgraduate	11.4	9
Income		
None	2.4	2
Under \$10,000	16.3	13
\$10,000-\$19,999	16.3	13
\$20,000-\$29,999	16.3	13
\$30,000-\$39,999	16.3	13
\$40,000-\$49,999	16.3	13
\$50,000-\$59,999	16.3	13
\$60,000-\$69,999	16.3	13
\$70,000-\$79,999	16.3	13
\$80,000-\$89,999	16.3	13
\$90,000-\$99,999	16.3	13
Over \$100,000	16.3	13
Marital status		
Never married	10.6	9
Married	1.6	1
Divorced	1.6	1
Widowed	1.6	1
Other	1.6	1
Other	1.6	1

This, future research should explore the possibility of mediating factors operating between self-reflection and self-rumination.

**Conclusion**  
This study provides empirical support for a control theory of happiness in that individual differences in hedonically relevant cognitive processes of self-reflection and self-rumination exert a significant influence on the individual's perception of subjective happiness. The individual's propensity to self-reflect or self-ruminate, however, was not found to be affected by an independent self-control as had been predicted based on the independent versus interdependent self-control theoretical framework. The results of this study suggest that meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for people who do not enjoy high levels of happiness. Although self-reflection has the potential to increase happiness, this study highlights the path of self-reflection to that of a more joyful self-rumination which has detrimental consequences for happiness. Finally, the discovery of the direct influence of an independent self-control on subjective happiness provides lead for future researchers and clinicians as search of hedonic consequences associated with the two cognitive variables, self-reflection and self-rumination as mediating factors between an independent self-control and happiness.

**Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of research variables**

Variable	Mean	SD
Subjective happiness	6.20	0.98
Independent self-control	6.10	0.75
Self-reflection	6.20	0.75
Self-rumination	6.20	0.75

**Table 2. Intercorrelations between research variables**

Variable	1	2	3	4
1 Independent self-control				
2 Subjective happiness	.20*			
3 Self-reflection	.16	.14		
4 Self-rumination	-.18	-.10**	.12*	

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**References**  
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
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Abstract

# Journals

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## Independent self-construal, self-reflection, and self-rumination: A path model for predicting happiness

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**Abstract**  
A central theme of happiness emphasizes the mediating impact of cognitive and motivational processes on the individual's perceptions of their happiness. This study investigated a path model with the two cognitive variables, self-reflection and self-rumination as mediating factors between an independent self-construal and happiness. One hundred and twenty-three participants completed a questionnaire designed to measure subjective happiness, independent self-construal, self-reflection and self-rumination. The general conclusion was that individuals with an independent self-construal, a higher independent self-construal was associated with greater happiness. The results also indicated that self-reflection led to the greatest and highest increase in happiness mediated by self-reflection. This study suggests that although meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for individuals who do not enjoy high levels of happiness, the path of self-reflection is that it may trigger self-rumination which has detrimental consequences for happiness.

The pursuit of happiness is central to human existence. Recently, research on happiness has been revitalized by the emergence of positive psychology with its focus on the evidence of human nature (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2001). The general consensus is that although to some degree objective situational factors (such as income, health, age, and marital status) are associated with happiness, the positive association between self-reflection and happiness is a subjective phenomenon, with subjective feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and evaluations associated with the hedonic pleasure that the situation itself (Angelo, 2003; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Diener, Wilson, & Biswas-Diener, 2000).

**A central theme of happiness:**  
The subjective perspective on happiness is reflected in one of the most developments in research on happiness (Layard, 2005). According to this central theme, happiness is determined by what people think of their experiences, that is, the way they construe and interpret the world around them (Lyubomirsky, 2005). In this regard, a central theme of happiness emphasizes the role of hedonic self-relevant cognitive and motivational processes in mediating the effects of person and situation factors (Seligman, 2003). The general consensus is that although to some degree objective situational factors (such as income, health, age, and marital status) are associated with happiness, the positive association between self-reflection and happiness is a subjective phenomenon, with subjective feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and evaluations associated with the hedonic pleasure that the situation itself (Angelo, 2003; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Diener, Wilson, & Biswas-Diener, 2000).

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Similarly, happy individuals have been found to be less prone to engage in self-reflection, or to think about and analyze one's thoughts, feelings, and evaluation of their actions (Lyubomirsky, 2005). However, research on happiness and self-reflection has shown that individuals who display extremely high or extremely low levels of happiness, Lyubomirsky and Ross (2000) demonstrated that when happy people were instructed to self-reflect, their behaviour mirrored the behaviour of unhappy individuals, whereas when unhappy individuals were prevented from engaging in self-reflection, their behaviour mirrored the behaviour of happy people. This suggests that similar to the hedonic consequences of self-rumination mentioned above, the hedonic consequences of self-reflection may be determined to the individual's perception of their happiness.

**Path model and hypotheses**  
Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that although independent and interdependent self-construals are predominant in individualistic and collectivistic cultures, respectively, individuals within a given society can be less or more independent or interdependent. (The distinction between individualistic and collectivistic societies refers to the extent to which the value of the individual takes precedence over, or is sacrificed to the needs of others.) Markus, Houtman, Ellis, Johnson, and Isen (1999) demonstrated that independent and interdependent self-construals are two separate constructs and suggested that the predictive capacities of these two variables should be investigated separately.

Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that for those with an independent self-construal knowledge about the self is more important and elaborated than knowledge about the other, one's internal dialogues, and the individual's self-construal is based on internal attributes, which facilitates motivation to obtain more self-knowledge. This suggests that individuals with a highly developed independent self-construal may be more prone to focus on themselves when reflecting on their life. For example, in Baumeister, Tice, Schmeichel, and Vohs's (2007) study, the shift in perception of pro-social behaviour is less obvious as a result of self-reflection was greater for individuals who emphasized the importance of self-knowledge over relationships with others. Therefore, a higher level of an independent self-construal as an individual variable may lead to greater self-reflection.

Markus and Kitayama (1991) posit that for those with an independent self-construal knowledge about the self is more important and elaborated than knowledge about the other, one's internal dialogues, and the individual's self-construal is based on internal attributes, which facilitates motivation to obtain more self-knowledge. This suggests that individuals with a highly developed independent self-construal may be more prone to focus on themselves when reflecting on their life. For example, in Baumeister, Tice, Schmeichel, and Vohs's (2007) study, the shift in perception of pro-social behaviour is less obvious as a result of self-reflection was greater for individuals who emphasized the importance of self-knowledge over relationships with others. Therefore, a higher level of an independent self-construal as an individual variable may lead to greater self-reflection.

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In this regard, the present study will be designed to investigate the hedonic consequences associated with the two cognitive variables, self-reflection and self-rumination as mediating factors between an independent self-construal and happiness. Another aim of this study was to assess the direct and indirect influence of self-reflection on subjective happiness. For these purposes a path model as presented in Figure 1 was constructed.



Figure 1. Path model predicting subjective happiness

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It was hypothesized that (a) a higher independent self-construal would be associated with greater self-reflection and less self-rumination, (b) greater self-reflection would be associated with greater self-rumination and less happiness, and (c) greater self-rumination would lead to less happiness.

**Method**  
**Participants**  
Participants were 123 residents of Rockhampton in Central Queensland (Australia,  $n = 97$ , male,  $n = 34$ , female,  $n = 2$ ). Participants ranged in age from 19-80 years ( $M = 34.50$ ,  $SD = 19.10$ ). Table 1 presents the age group, education level, marital status, and income level of the participants.

Demographic variable	%	n
Age		
19-24 years	18.0	22
25-29 years	18.0	22
30-34 years	18.0	22
35-39 years	18.0	22
40 years and over	38.0	47
Gender		
Male	35.0	43
Female	65.0	80
Married	3.0	4
Single	21.0	26
Partner	76.0	93
Education		
Primary	2.0	2
1-1 year secondary school	4.0	5
1-4 year secondary school	10.0	12
University	84.0	104
Employment		
Unemployed	2.0	2
Employed	98.0	121
Income		
Less than \$10,000	18.0	22
\$10,000-\$19,999	18.0	22
\$20,000-\$29,999	18.0	22
\$30,000-\$39,999	18.0	22
\$40,000-\$49,999	4.0	5
\$50,000-\$59,999	4.0	5
More than \$60,000	17.0	21
Married	3.0	4


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Therefore, and also to test their associates to participate in the study. The overall return rate for the 200 questionnaire distributed was 85%, with 123 questionnaires (94.82%) out of the total 130 questionnaires returned being completed in the analysis. (The data of some respondents were not included in the analysis due to a larger number of missing values.)

**Results**  
**Descriptive statistics**  
Means and standard deviations of the four research variables are presented in Table 2. The mean of subjective happiness ( $M = 4.90$ ,  $SD = 0.99$ ) in the sample is lower than the mean reported by Lyubomirsky and Ross (1999) in a US high school sample ( $M = 4.11$ ,  $SD = 0.79$ ) for individuals who were classified as extremely happy individuals. Participants' gender, level of income, marital status, educational level, and age group had no significant effect on subjective happiness. The results of the reliability analysis indicated that all four measures had acceptable levels of internal consistency (the Cronbach's alpha).

Variable	Mean	SD
Subjective happiness	4.90	0.99
Independent self-construal	6.05	1.19
Self-reflection	3.40	1.24
Self-rumination	3.40	1.24

	1	2	3	4
1. Independent self-construal				
2. Subjective happiness	.20*			
3. Self-reflection	-.19*	-.14		
4. Self-rumination	-.18*	-.10*	.19*	



Thus, future research should explore the possibility of mediating factors operating between self-reflection and self-rumination.

**Conclusion**  
This study provides empirical support for a central theme of happiness in that individual differences in hedonically relevant cognitive processes of self-reflection and self-rumination exert a significant influence on the individual's perception of subjective happiness. The individual's propensity to self-reflect or self-ruminate, however, was not found to be affected by an independent self-construal as had been predicted based on the independent versus interdependent self-construal theoretical framework. The results of this study suggest that meaningful self-reflection may be beneficial for people who do not enjoy high levels of happiness. Although self-reflection has the potential to increase happiness, this study highlights the path of self-reflection is that it may trigger self-rumination which has detrimental consequences for happiness. Finally, the discovery of the direct influence of self-reflection on happiness and self-rumination as a result of self-reflection may be beneficial for future researchers and practitioners as hedonic consequences associated with the two cognitive variables for predicting happiness.

**Acknowledgements**  
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

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