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# STM: Securing Access to content using EZproxy

#### **Don Hamparian**

Senior Product Manager, EZproxy and Identity Management



# Today's discussion

- About OCLC and EZproxy
- Publisher Best Practices
- Institutions Best Practices
- Issues & Opportunities



Image from Flickr, NET-BUSINESS



Founded in

1967
as the Ohio College
Library Center

16,957 members worldwide


1,200+ staff

18 offices in

10 countries











365
million records

2.3 billion holdings

46
million digital items

17
million eBooks





#### **Shared data**

about the world's libraries. Find it and get it.



#### **Shared infrastructure**

to manage and share resources across libraries and across communities.




## **Shared community**

of libraries, library users and partners, working together to share the world's knowledge.




#### **OCLC's Four Product Lines**





# **OCLC Partnering with Publishers**

- Long-standing collaboration with publishers
- We all want to make sure content libraries buy for patrons is accessible and secured





# **EZproxy Overview**

- EZproxy provides patrons affiliated with our mutual customers access to IP authenticated e-content even when they are off the library network
- EZproxy's default operating mode is as a URL-rewriting IP proxy server. No configuration is needed at the patron's PC to use EZproxy
- EZproxy is used by about 80% of North American ARLs and has about 3,500 deployments worldwide
- EZproxy can be hosted by OCLC or hosted at the institution



# Context of the e-Content Access Workflow and EZproxy

- EZproxy became available in 2000
- Much simpler era: no scihubs and simpler technology at websites made EZproxy Admin's work easier
- In the last 5 years, the care and feeding of this workflow has grown much more complicated
- Libraries caught in the crunch of balancing budgets and dedicating resources to providing access



# **Summary of Issues and Opportunities**

- Most common problem (by far) is compromised credentials at the institution
- EZproxy is not "hacked"
- Four-part strategy to secure access
  - Protect (Proper configuration)
  - Detect and close compromised credentials
  - Educate (Provider, Institution Admin, Users)
  - Collaborate (OCLC, Institution, Provider)



# **Publisher Best Practices**

- Work with your customers to resolve illegitimate access
- Vast majority of illegitimate usage can be traced through EZproxy to real users that can be turned off
- If you find "how-to" gaps contact OCLC
- Don't turn off access unless you talk to your customer



# **Institution Best Practices**

- Password Policies
  - Biggest challenge get this done and EZproxy provides a very secure content access path
  - Require: short-lived passwords and hard-to-guess passwords
- Credential protection
  - Don't sell or give away your credentials
- Commit resources for EZproxy server management



# **Institution Best Practices**

- Keep your evidence (configure log / audit files with data you need)
- Use SSL for authentication and content access where possible
- Keep the server EZproxy is on upgraded and protected via firewall
- Install the current version of EZproxy
- Keep your system time correct



### **Institution Best Practices**

- Review your logs regularly looking for:
  - Top consumers of content
  - Top session length users
  - Multiple geographies
  - Countries you know your users aren't in
- Normally detect using information above OR information from providers: we can link date-time-URL to an active session in EZproxy which gives us a username
- Then the institution needs to turn off the user, reset the password or follow their policy for compromised accounts



# **Collaborate - Opportunities**

Involving providers, OCLC, Libraries

- Improve education
- Improve technology
- Improve support of our mutual customers
- Your ideas?



## **Questions?**

#### **Don Hamparian**

Senior Product Manager, EZproxy and Identity Management, OCLC

hamparid@oclc.org

Did I mention good password policies?

# Because what is known must be shared.

